Dataset

The dataset EU SMM Practices in Election Periods provides an analysis of social media monitoring practices employed by European Union member states during election periods from 2016 to 2023. It encompasses data on the establishment of dedicated monitoring entities, the deployment of AI technologies in monitoring efforts and the regulatory frameworks governing online political campaigns. This compilation aims to serve as a crucial resource for researchers, policymakers and analysts interested in understanding the evolving landscape of digital oversight within the EU.

You can access the dataset here.

Codebook

Social media monitoring

This column indicates whether social media monitoring is conducted by governmental entities during election periods. The values in this column are encoded as follows:

1: Social media monitoring is conducted by governmental entities during the election period. This may include monitoring campaign activities, the spread of misinformation, or foreign interference.
0: No social media monitoring activities are conducted by governmental entities during the election period. This indicates a lack of effort to systematically track social media content during elections.

Task force

This column identifies the establishment of a dedicated task force, center, or group within the government specifically designated for the purpose of monitoring social media activities during election periods.

1: A specialised entity for social media monitoring during elections has been established.

0: No specific entity has been established for this purpose, suggesting either an informal approach to social media monitoring or reliance on existing structures without a dedicated team.

Task force setup year

The ‘Task Force Establishment Year’ column indicates the founding year of each task force or initiative included in the dataset. This column is populated with the earliest known establishment year for each listed entity. For instance, if the ‘East StratCom Task Force’ was initiated in 2015 and the ‘Rapid Alert System’ began operations in 2018, the ‘Task Force Establishment Year’ for the East StratCom Task Force would be noted as ‘2015’ to denote its inception. For a detailed breakdown and additional insights into each task force or initiative, consult the ‘GovSMMPractices_RawData’ file.

Disinformation Law

In the categorisation regarding disinformation laws, the following criteria is used:

1: This includes countries that have laws explicitly criminalising disinformation. These laws might be comprehensive, covering disinformation broadly, or they might target specific aspects of disinformation. For instance, a country, such as Croatia, which has enacted legislation penalising certain forms of disinformation or imposing specific broadcasting requirements related to disinformation, falls into this category.
0: This category encompasses two scenarios:
- Countries without any enacted law specifically targeting disinformation. Regardless of any other efforts or initiatives that might be in place, if there is not a specific law that criminalises disinformation, the country is categorised as “No”.
- Countries that are in the process of drafting, proposing, or developing laws, but have not yet formally enacted such laws. While these countries are making strides to address disinformation, they do not yet have a formal legal framework that explicitly criminalises it. For detailed information on the efforts of these countries to address disinformation, refer to the ‘related efforts to address disinformation’ column in the dataset.

Please note that this dataset is based on the status as of September 2023. Any changes to disinformation laws that have occurred after this date may not be reflected in this dataset.

Regulation for online campaigns

The “Regulation for Online Campaigns” column indicates the presence and extent of legal or regulatory frameworks established by the government or relevant authorities to oversee and govern online political campaigning during election periods.

Implemented: Indicates that regulations for online campaigns have been put into action.
Limited: Denotes basic regulations that address only certain aspects of online campaigning, with minimal enforcement.
Unregulated: Reflects the absence of specific regulations for online political campaigning, indicating a regulatory gap.

AI-powered SMM

The “AI-Powered SMM” column indicates the utilisation of AI in social media monitoring. This determination is based on our own dataset compilation as well as data derived from Feldstein’s (2022) “AI Global Surveillance Index,” particularly the section on social media surveillance. Values in this column signify:

1: AI technologies are actively employed in social media monitoring.
0: There is an absence of evidence to suggest the use of AI technologies in social media monitoring efforts, according to the available data and findings.

Notes

The “Notes” column lists the names of the task force/Centre responsible, alongside their respective years of establishment. If there are multiple entities involved, their names and the years they were established are also detailed in this column.

This dataset was constructed from aggregated data spanning election periods from 2016 to 2023. For detailed information at the election level, please consult the “GovSMM_raw.xlsx” file.